This paper examines two important issues related to bank mergers in India. First, we estimate potential economic gains of state owned banks if they undergo consolidation. Scale economies, returns to scale and profit efficiency of state owned banks during 1986 to 2003 are estimated based on stochastic frontier analysis. We find that many Indian banks exhibit potential cost savings from mergers provided they rationalize their branch networks although profit efficiency may not rise immediately. Second we measure the realized impact of bank mergers on shareholders" wealth based on event study analysis. We find that in the case of forced mergers, shareholders of neither the bidder nor the target banks benefited. In the case of voluntary mergers, the bidder banks" shareholders gained more than the target banks" shareholders.
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions have become an important strategy of the global financial services industry during the last fifteen years. Over 10,000 financial firms underwent acquisitions in the major industrialized countries from 1990 to 2001 and the figure was 15,500 worldwide (Amel et al., 2004) . The key driving force for this activity is severe competition among firms of the same industry, which puts focus on economies of scale, cost efficiency and profitability. The other motive for mergers is enhancing shareholders" wealth. Many studies (e.g. see the review by Berger and Humphrey, 1994 ) have evaluated such merger benefits, specific to the banking sectors of the US, UK, Japan and European countries. However, research evidence on mergers in emerging markets is scarce. This paper tries to fill this gap by analyzing mergers in the Indian banking sector.
The paper examines two important issues related to bank mergers in India, viz. an ex ante issue in anticipation of mergers and an ex post issue of realized mergers. First, we estimate potential scale benefits in Indian banking industry considering all the state owned banks, which constitute more than 70% of the assets of banking industry. The benefits from consolidation are intrinsically related to the existence of scale economies. Thus, expanding the scale of operations through a merger (or takeover) is expected to fetch substantial cost savings. Hence, while examining the potential benefits from consolidation, it becomes imperative to investigate whether state owned banks in India exhibit scale economies. If they do, then there is a case for cost savings out of consolidation. Accordingly, we examine scale economies of state owned banks using data set for the period 1986 to 2003 by estimating a stochastic cost frontier and computing the Ray scale economies and returns to scale. Our results indicate significant reduction in costs, provided the banks go for rationalisation of their branch networks. The reduction in costs are expected to be significant for smaller banks, rather than for large banks.
However, the analysis fails to show any evidence of immediate improvement in profit efficiency.
To reap the main benefits of cost reduction through mergers, our study strongly recommends rationalisation of branch networks of the state-owned banks.
The second issue we examine is the impact of mergers on the wealth of shareholders of Indian banks. For this, we conduct event study analysis of forced and voluntary mergers. Mergers are usually market-driven. But in the Indian context, most of the bank mergers are forced mergers with the intervention of regulatory authority, viz. the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This offers a unique case study, which is not observable in the developed countries. Some emerging markets such as Malaysia have already witnessed forced mergers and some others having state-owned banks are likely to witness forced mergers. Hence, the conclusions drawn from this study would be useful to strengthen the evidence on forced mergers and provide insights to policy makers in effective implementation of merger schemes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyse scale economies in Indian bank mergers, which constitutes a pre-merger analysis and then examine the impact of mergers on shareholders" wealth, which forms a post merger analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the Indian banking system and the merger trends. In Section 3, we briefly review the theoretical literature and empirical evidence on bank consolidation. Next in Section 4, we present an econometric exercise wherein we estimate the cost function for Indian state owned banks and compute the economies of scale, returns to scale and profit efficiency. In Section 5, we analyze the impact of mergers on shareholders" wealth by conducting event study analysis. Finally in Section 6, we summarize the entire discussion and conclude the paper.
Indian Banking System and Merger Trends
The Indian commercial banking system comprises of state-owned banks (known as public sector banks), private banks as well as branches of foreign banks operating in India. The first two decades of the financial system in post-independent India (1947-69) were fairly liberal, with limited controls on credit and interest rates. However, the main criticism of the banking policy during this period was poor allocation of resources to larger parts of India and that the savings potential of households was not fully exploited. As a consequence, the Government of India acquired the ownership of twenty erstwhile private banks in 1969 and 1980 and exercised control over credit allocation, interest rates and enhanced both primary and secondary reserve ratios. The Government tightened its control over the credit allocation process to ensure adequate credit flow into industrial and agricultural activities in conformity with national level economic plan priorities. In addition to acquisition of control over commercial banks, the Government also promoted certain development banks catering to various segments of industry and agriculture.
The controlled regime of Indian banking has achieved tangible results of increase in per capita deposits and credits and widening of banking services to rural and semi-urban areas with the opening up of branches (Table-I ). Large scale economic activity has been brought under the preview of organised banking system. Since nationalization, the banking system was dominated by public sector banks, which accounted for over 90% of total commercial banking assets, and around 85% of bank branches; the number of private and foreign banks remained stagnant and their branch expansion was restricted. The adverse impact of the controlled regime of banking was on the commercial parameters of banks such as profitability and solvency, which had completely taken a back seat, while social aspects dominated, resulting in an inefficient banking system. The competitive strength of Indian banks in global markets had declined substantially and the primary concern for the policy makers was strengthening of the banking system.
In order to make the banking system profitable, efficient and resilient, the Government initiated the financial liberalisation process in 1992. Financial liberalisation was also an imperative to make Indian banks globally competitive. A comprehensive financial sector reforms package was suggested by a Government-appointed committee. This committee"s recommendations include, among others, introduction of prudential accounting and capital adequacy norms, deregulation of interest rates, greater autonomy in day-today operations, disinvestment of shares of government owned banks, flexible entry norms for opening up of private sector banks and consolidation of banks through mergers and acquisitions.
Although widely discussed as being among the recent developments, mergers are however not a totally new phenomena in Indian banking. During the period 1961-68, 46 bank mergers took place in India. Many small banks were unable to operate at profitable levels, mainly due to small size and so these were merged with other healthy banks (see Table-II) . But mergers have recently gained importance since 2000, when the first market driven merger viz. the acquisition of Times Bank by HDFC bank took place. In the process of strengthening the financial sector, the RBI has envisaged consolidation of banks through mergers and acquisitions. On introduction of prudential accounting and capital adequacy norms, many small private sector banks have shown the symptoms of sickness such as huge amount of Non Performing Assets (NPAs), decline in capital adequacy ratio substantially below the mandatory level of 8 percent and low profitability.
In order to avoid serious runs of these banks and to protect the depositors" interests, the RBI has merged these troubled banks with other healthy public and private sector banks. We refer to these as forced mergers. In the forced mergers, the RBI prepares the merger plans, which are implemented by the acquiring bank. The acquiring bank has limited choice over implementation of the merger scheme. Interestingly, all these bidder banks are listed on the stock exchange and Government of India is typically the major shareholder. Hence, the impact of forced mergers on acquired bank"s shareholders" wealth is also a serious concern from the corporate governance point of view. On the other hand, three private sector banks have voluntarily acquired other private banks as per their strategic considerations. These are referred to in this paper as voluntary mergers.
Another category is the mergers of Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) with banks. Over a period, several DFIs have been part of the Indian financial system. These were established with an objective of improving allocation efficiency of resources to various segments of the economy.
But due to the flexibility provided to banks by the RBI in the deregulated scenario, especially in credit delivery, banks have widened their loan portfolio to project finance, long term loans and other specialised sectoral financing. This made the presence of DFIs redundant. An RBI appointed Working Group (RBI, 1998) suggested that these institutions should explore the possibility of gainful mergers with different sets of financial entities like banks and DFIs based on commercial considerations. The related merger of ICICI (an erstwhile DFI) with ICICI bank has been considered as a "mega merger" in the Indian context. This increased the size of ICICI bank"s assets from INR 1,97,366 million to INR 10,49,590 million which is almost a five-time increase. 1 We prefer to group these mergers in the category of forced mergers due to the intervention of the regulator in these cases. The public sector banks have not witnessed mergers among themselves. However, on several occasions, policy makers have indicated that the banking sector will be consolidated by merging the public sector banks and have emphasized on a transformation of the banking system "from a regime of large number of small banks to small number of large banks" (Leeladhar, 2005) . Hence, public sector banks are the right candidates to analyse potential benefits such as scale economies of mergers. This motivates our analysis of the potential benefits from merger of public sector banks-before we move on to assess the impact of realized mergers involving private banks.
Review of Literature
Extant empirical literature on bank mergers can be broadly categorized into two streams. One stream of the literature has looked into ex ante issues such as rationale, scope and potential candidates of mergers. The other is related to ex post issues such as impact of mergers on shareholder value and bank performance.
Ex ante issues:
Laderman (2000) explores potential diversification benefits to be had from banks merging with non-banking financial service firms. Simulated mergers between US banks and non-bank financial service firms show that investment in insurance underwriting and securities 1 The present exchange rate is INR (Indian Rupees) 42 = $ 1.
brokerage are optimal for reducing the probability of bankruptcy for bank-holding companies. In sum, the international evidence does not provide strong evidence on merger benefits in the banking industry. In this paper, we first examine the ex ante issue of potential cost benefits from mergers in the context of Indian banking in the next section. Subsequently, we take up the ex post issue of the impact of realized mergers on shareholders" wealth.
Scale Economies and Efficiency

Estimation methodology and data
Our analysis of potential scale economies is based on estimation of a bank"s cost function of the following type:
where C is operating costs, Y is the vector of outputs and W is the vector of input prices. The sub-scripts i and t represent bank and year, respectively.
What constitutes bank output is a matter of intense debate in the banking literature. The issue essentially boils down to the question of whether or not to include deposits as part of bank output. We follow the value-added approach, which has been frequently used in Indian studies (see Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003 and Sensarma, 2006) . In other words, our output vector consists of three categories of deposits, viz. fixed, saving and current deposits, investments and loans. The inputs in the production technology are considered to be labour and capital. The price of labor (W1) is defined as the ratio of established expenses to total employees. The price of capital (W2) is measured as the ratio of capital expenses to fixed assets. All nominal variables are converted to real by taking them at 1993-94 prices.
In order to estimate the cost function, we assume the following translog form:
Next, we impose certain theoretically desirable properties. We apply the usual symmetry restrictions, that follow from Young"s theorem, a ml =a lm and b jk =b kj . To ensure linear homogeneity in W, the following restrictions are imposed:
Cost and input prices are normalised by the price of capital before taking logarithms to impose linear input price homogeneity. The estimation of the cost function can be done in several ways.
While regression method seems to be the most obvious choice, its applicability in banking data has been criticised in the literature. Regression method would implicitly assume that all banks are equally efficient, which is not so in reality (Berger and Humphrey, 1992) . To overcome this problem, stochastic frontier analysis is popularly used in the literature to estimate the cost function. While there are various versions of this methodology, we use the one given by Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989) . The error term in the cost equation is assumed to have two parts as follows:
The random error is V it ~ iid N (0, (Coelli, 1996) .
Having estimated the coefficients of the cost function, we compute economies of scale by the Ray Scale Economies (RSCE) measure which is given as,
is cost elasticity of the m th output. This measure tells us whether, consequent to an equi-proportionate increase in outputs produced, the cost goes up by more than or less than the increase in outputs. If the increase in costs is less (more), then the bank is said to exhibit scale economies (diseconomies). We also compute Returns to scale (RTS), which is given by the
. Depending on whether the RTS is greater than or less than one, the bank would be characterized by increasing returns to scale (indicating scale economies) or decreasing returns to scale (indicating scale diseconomies).
We make two sets of estimations, one by including branches as output in the cost function, and one excluding branches. The former would give us estimates of scale economies considering an increase in number of branches, along with all other outputs, and the latter would denote the case of unchanged number of branches (e.g. branch rationalization), but expansion of all other outputs, during consolidation. 
Scale economies, Cost gains Vs Revenue gains: Analysis of results
Values of RSCE and RTS are computed for each PSB in each year. We present below the mean values over the years in Table III and the values for individual banks in the last year of our data set in Table IV . When branches are included in the output vector, the values of RSCE is greater than one and those of RTS are less than one for all years. This indicates that expansion of bank size accompanied with an increase in the number of branches, would not lead to cost savings. On the other hand, the corresponding values when branches are excluded are less than one in the case of RSCE and greater than one in the case of RTS. This indicates that if banks increase their size while maintaining their present number of branches, then there could be cost savings. In other words, in case PSBs go for size expansion, it should be done without increasing the number of branches. This finding was earlier observed by Srivastava (2000) who concluded that the number of branches are too high and "many of these branches are under-utilized, unable to generate large volume of deposits or loans" (Srivastava, 2000) .
Thus, rationalisation of branches is going to be a key factor in consolidation of PSBs. We now move to some bank-specific results. In order to ascertain the cost performance of a bank in a year, we can estimate a measure of cost efficiency based on the stochastic frontier. Cost efficiency measures the cost performance of a banking firm, relative to the best-practice (least-cost) bank that produces the same output under the same exogenous conditions. After estimating the stochastic cost frontier, the cost efficiency for bank i at time t is measured as the ratio between the minimum cost (C min ) necessary to produce that bank"s output and the actual cost (C it ):
After computing the cost efficiency estimates, we conduct two specific inquiries. First, did banks gain from mergers in terms of cost efficiency? Second, are big banks more cost efficient than small banks? To answer the first question, we chose not to do a statistical analysis because of the very few cases of mergers during the period considered by us, relative to the sample size.
However, we looked at some specific cases of mergers, such as the spate of mergers in 1990
involving Allahabad Bank, Indian Overseas Bank (IOB), Indian Bank and BOI. In case of Allahabad Bank and IOB, cost efficiency fluctuated in every year around the merger, thereby not revealing any clear trend (see Table V given. Alternative profit function assumes that banks can have some power in determining output prices and therefore, they maximize profits choosing the output prices, while output quantities and input prices are given. Thus, standard profit function is specified as a function of input and output prices, whereas alternative profit function is specified as a function of input prices and output quantities. Sensarma (2005) provides a discussion on why alternative profit is a more appropriate concept for Indian banking. Accordingly, we adopt alternative profit function rather than standard profit to study profit efficiency of Indian PSBs.
The alternative profit specification employs the same set of exogenous variables as the cost function, with the only difference that profit replaces cost as the dependant variable in the frontier regression. Therefore, the alternative profit frontier is given by (subsuming cross-section and time subscripts):
Where P is the profit of the firm and the other variables are as explained before (all variables are in logarithms). Profit efficiency is measured by the ratio between the actual profit of a bank and the maximum possible profit that is achievable by the most efficient bank.
In other words, if profit efficiency score of a bank is say 90 percent, then it means that the bank is losing about 10 percent of its potential profits to X-inefficiency or managerial failure by choosing sub-optimal input quantities and outputs prices. Once again, we follow the Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989) methodology for estimating the profit frontier and subsequently computing profit efficiency.
After computing the profit efficiency estimates, we conduct two specific inquiries. First, did banks gain from mergers in terms of profit efficiency? Second, are big banks more profit efficient than small banks? To answer the first question, we looked at some specific cases of mergers, such as the spate of mergers in 1990 involving Allahabad Bank, IOB, Indian Bank and BOI. In case of Allahabad Bank, profit efficiency declined in the next year and then fluctuated in every subsequent year thereby not revealing any clear trend. In the latter three cases, profit efficiency went up in the next year, but this increase was not sustained in the subsequent years (see Table VI ). On the other hand, profit efficiency actually declined in the next year and picked up subsequently for the mergers involving Bank of Baroda and Union Bank of India in 2000.
Another case is of OBC, which acquired two banks in 1998 and there seems to have been no impact on its profit efficiency. Thus, the evidence in this regard is inconclusive. Our findings do not support the expectation that profit performance of banks would go up subsequent to mergers.
This hypothesis seems to be borne out for the Indian case when we analyzed the relationship between size and profit performance of PSBs, taking profit efficiency as our indicator of profit performance.
Moving on to the relationship between size and profit efficiency, once again we do not find a clear relationship. For the year 2003, banks with high profit efficiency are not necessarily the large banks (see Table VI ). In fact, small banks like some of the SBI Associates have high profit efficiency. Similarly, many big banks have poor profit performance in terms of profit efficiency. 3 The lessons from the above empirical analyses are as follows. PSBs are not expected to have cost gains from mergers, unless the exercise is accompanied by branch rationalization. The cost gains from mergers are expected to be most for small banks and the least for large banks. Finally, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that mergers would bring any immediate improvement in profit performance. The implication of these results is that while the need for consolidation is not motivated by cost or revenue benefits, it would rather depend on other factors. Even in such a case, banks have to carefully implement the merger exercise, for example, by closing down redundant branches) in order to reap the merger benefits and to improve the bottom line.
Bank Mergers and Market Valuation of Equity
As mentioned before, Indian banking sector has witnessed two types of mergers. In the first type i.e. forced mergers initiated by the RBI, the main objective has been to protect the interests of depositors of weak banks. When a bank has shown symptoms of sickness such as huge NPAs, substantial erosion of net worth due that decline of capital adequacy ratio, RBI has intervened and merged the weak bank with a strong bank (Table VII) There have been eighteen cases of bank mergers during the period 1993 to 2006. Out of these, three were voluntary mergers. These were merger/ amalgamation of a private sector bank with another private sector bank purely driven by business considerations. We categorize the remaining fifteen cases were forced mergers. Among these fifteen, two cases involved convergence of DFIs into commercial banks. The objective here was to follow a universal bank model, which would offer a wide range of financial services. In the first case, ICICI Limited (a private sector DFI) has been merged with its subsidiary banking unit ICICI Bank Limited and the merged entity emerged as the largest private sector bank and as the second largest bank in India.
In the second case, the Government decided to transform the public sector DFI, Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) into a commercial bank by having it acquire its subsidiary, viz. IDBI Bank Limited, which was a private sector bank. After the merger a new public sector commercial bank was formed. At the time of the mergers both the DFIs ICICI Limited and IDBI were in poor financial health, with huge NPAs and low profitability. Restructuring was essential and inevitable; hence there were regulatory interventions in the mergers involving these two institutions. We categorize these two mergers under forced mergers for the purpose of event study analysis. The remaining thirteen forced mergers were mergers of weak banks with existing public and private sector banks. Almost all the target banks in this category were small private sector banks, suffering with problems of capital adequacy, high NPAs and low profitability. We analyzed six such cases of forced mergers in the event study analysis. In the remaining cases, either the target and bidder banks were both unlisted, or the size of the target bank was substantially less than that of the bidder bank. Hence, these cases would carry little significance for our analysis of mergers.
Event Study Analysis
The event study methodology used in our analysis has been widely used in the literature in a variety of contexts (Mackinlay, 1997) . To ensure that any information leakage is being captured, we allow the identified merger period (event window) to include four days before and four days after the merger (event). A similar window period was adopted by Chong Beng-Soon et al. (2006) . We collected daily adjusted closing prices of stocks and the market index (Sensex) from CMIE Prowess, which is a comprehensive financial database of Indian companies.
We estimate Abnormal returns (AR), that indicate the additional impact on stock returns due to an event over and above normal market movements as follows:
where, R it is the daily return on firm "i" on day"t" and R mt is the return on the bench mark index, α and β are OLS regression parameters that are estimated using the market model, over the previous period of 150 days. We estimate abnormal returns for both bidder and target banks and then test the significance of abnormal returns based on the Standard Errors (SE), as suggested by 
Analysis of Results
In four out of the six forced mergers that we examined, the shareholders of bidder banks appeared to have lost their market value of equity (Table VIII and Thus in all the cases of forced mergers, the shareholders of neither the bidder bank nor the target bank seem to have gained upon announcement of the merger. Further, the shareholders of bidder banks have lost their wealth when the merger announcement is perceived as a negative signal.
Our results suggest that the regulator needs to rethink its policy of reviving weak banks through mergers. The RBI believes that merger of weak banks with strong banks is essential for restructuring of the banking system and is a desirable step in consolidating the financial sector.
However, in most of the forced merger cases, the target banks were identified for acquiring the weak bank almost after the collapse of the latter. At that stage, the acquirer bank, under instructions from the RBI, was left without any other option. Instead of this procedure, the RBI should activate the Prompt Corrective Action system (PCA) and identify the weak banks on the basis of certain symptoms. This would help the bidder banks to choose target banks, based on strategic considerations, which is likely to benefit all the stakeholders.
Turning to the cases of voluntary mergers, we find that in two out of the three voluntary merger cases, the gains to target banks" shareholders are higher than that of bidder banks (Table IX) .
Both the target and bidder banks" shareholders benefited upon announcement of the mergers.
Thus, the stock markets welcomed mergers which would lead to enhanced growth prospects for the merged entity and therefore shareholders of both banks benefited out of such mergers ( Figure   3 shareholders of BOM. But the shareholders of ICICI bank did not achieve any gains. This is not surprising, because shareholders of a troubled bank stand to gain from a merger with a strong bank, whereas the same may not be good news from the perspective of the strong acquiring bank.
In the case of amalgamation of Bank of Punjab with Centurion Bank, the amalgamation was an inevitable restructuring for both the banks, as both intended to grow but experienced dismal performance. Both the banks came forward to build a growth-oriented bank on the basis of each other"s strengths. Centurion Bank was active in western part of India, whereas Bank of Punjab was active in northern part of the country. The combined entity"s deposits have shown a growth of 20 percent, its advances increased by 41.7 percent and the ROA increased to 0.89 percent 5 .
However, an event study analysis of stock returns revealed that neither of the banks"
shareholders considered the merger as a positive event and the announcement led to deterioration in shareholders" wealth. It appears that shareholders of both the banks would have preferred a merger with a stronger bank and the news of amalgamation with another troubled bank may not have been welcomed by the stock markets.
In sum, results from the event study analysis suggest that in case of voluntary bank mergers between a weak and a strong bank, shareholders of the weak bank benefit and those of the strong bank lose. However, if both banks are weak (strong) then the merger leads to a fall (rise) in shareholder value.
Conclusion
This paper undertakes an ex ante analysis of bank mergers in India by examining potential costs savings from consolidation in public sector banking. Next, we undertake an ex post analysis by studying the impact of realized mergers on shareholders" wealth. In the ex ante analysis, we estimate scale economies and returns to scale which suggest that public sector banks are unlikely to achieve cost gains from mergers unless the process is accompanied by branch rationalization.
Further, based on these results as well as estimates of cost efficiency, we conclude that cost gains may be forthcoming only for the smaller banks and not for bigger banks. Results from profit efficiency estimation suggest that mergers are unlikely to bring in immediate improvement in profit performance. Thus, mergers would not necessarily be associated with cost or revenue benefits; rather if mergers do take place because of other factors, banks have to carefully implement the merger exercise (e.g. by closing down redundant branches) in order to achieve economic gains.
Our ex post analysis of shareholders" wealth suggests that while forced bank mergers may be protecting the interests of depositors, shareholders of both bidder and target banks do not perceive any benefits from the merger. Our event study results show that both bidder and target banks" market value of equity have been eroded upon the announcement of mergers. However, in the case of voluntary mergers, the results are mixed. Merger between two strong banks was welcomed by the stock markets whereas, merger of two weak banks have not benefited either bank"s shareholders.
The above results provide important policy implications. The failure of forced mergers to reward shareholders suggests that the RBI should activate the mechanism of Prompt Corrective Action which would help in identifying a sick bank. Moreove,r the timing of the merger may be advanced to avoid a total collapse of the weak bank. This will also help the bidder banks in formulating appropriate strategies, which may mitigate the dilution in market value of equity consequent upon merger. To ensure the availability of financial services to all segments of the population, the RBI needs to approve voluntary mergers conditional upon the disadvantaged segments being unaffected by the process and approval should be linked to specific plans offered by the acquirers to mitigate the extent of financial exclusion. 
